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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
YJ.\DA J. T01fLINSON ACOTT, REBA
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Plaintiff,

-vs1,ESLIE A. TO~ILINSON, Individually

and as Administrator of the Estate of A.
L. Tomlinson, Deceased,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AKD RESPONDENTS
NTATE1fENT OF FACTS
This case

i~

supple1nental to the case of Acott, et
al r. Tomlinson, 9 Ftah 2d 71, 337 P. 2d 720, (hereinafter referred to as "prior case"), and represents a
snit by plaintiffs to enforce the judgment rendered in
that action. The judgment in the prior case which was
affirmed by this Court did four things:
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(1) It iinposed a trust upon an undivided 12/21sts
of the interest in certain mining claims held by appellant;
( 2) Awarded a money judg1nent to respondents
against appellant mnounting to $24,525.07;
(3) Imposed a trust upon 12/21sts of a claim for
certain 1nonies appellant had against Therald N. Jensen
and Frank B. Hanson; and
(4) Imposed a trust upon 12/21sts of a clai1n which
appellant had against Union Carbide Nuclear Company
for royalties on ores produced by that Company under
a lease of the mining properties.
The judgment divested title to the property interest
and funds from appellant, and vested the interest in
respondents. (R. #7468, p. 96-7).
The judgment did nothing as to the 9/21sts interest
of record in appellant's name which represented a 2/2lsts
interest appellant had acquired in his own right as an
heir of his father and a 7/21sts interest conveyed outright to appellant by his mother. (R. #7 468, p. 85, Finding
31). At the trial of the prior suit on September 13,
1955, Mrs. Lillie Tomlinson, appellant's mother, was
called as a witness for appellant, and disclaimed any
interest whatsoever to the property she had conveyed
to appellant. (Case No. 7468, Tr. 1: p. 186 lines 7-13;
p. 197, lines 10-24; p. 199, lines 7-18; p. 203, lines 28-29;
p. 204, lines 9-10).
The present suit, as shown by the pleadings, represents an action by the respondents against Union Carbide
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1\ ueh'ar Company to recover the 12/21sts of royalties
then accrued which the prior case determined should
be held in trust for respondents. (R. #8005, p. 1-4).
In addition, the complaint sought a declaration of the
plaintiffs' rights in and to future royalties. As the
Third-Party complaint of Union Carbide Nuclear Cornpuny shows, the suit was necessitated by a letter to
that C01npany from appellant's attorney, despite the
judgment in the previous suit, advising Union Carbide
that any n1onies ·would be paid to respondents at the
Company's jeopardy. (R. #8005, p. 10-12). Feeling insecure in n1aking any payn1ents to respondents, Union
Carbide would not pay the money over without a judgment against the1n. The ans\ver of Union Carbide
Nuclear Company alleged that it ·was ready to make
pay1nent of the royalties then on hand and which would
accrue in the future· and would abide by any Order
of the Court as to the disposition of these royalties.
l Tnion Carbide brought appellant into the suit ( designating him as a third-party defendant although he should
properly have been a defendant in an interpleader
action) in order that any rights which he 1night have
could be ascertained in the suit and Union Carbide
1\uclear Cmnpany would be protected. (R. #8005, p.
10~19). Appellant thereupon filed an ansvi'er and counterclaim to the third-party complaint alleging, despite the
drcree to the contrary in the prior suit, that he was
the owner of the entire interest in the mining claims

and entitled to receive all of the monies held
( ~arhide

~uclear

b~·

Union

C01npany. (R. #8005, p. 26)
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Between the time this action was coininenced and
the time that appellant filed his answer and counterclaim, a writ of execution had been issued in the prior
suit directing the Sheriff to levy upon the property of
appellant in satisfaction of the Inoney judgment. (R.
#7 468 -2, p. 3±) On 11ay 1, 1958 the Sheriff of Emery
County sold at public auction "the interest of Leslie
A. Tomlinson" in the mining claims above referred to,
and at this sale plaintiffs purchased this interest. (R.
#8005, p. 28).
By his counterclaim, appellant set out allegations
respecting the aforesaid Sheriff's Sale and alleged that
because respondents and appellant were brothers and
sisters the sale was void. (R. #8005, p. 26). No allegations
were made respecting the price paid for the property
interest, nor any unfair circumstances attending the sale.
He alleged further that Union Carbide Nuclear Company
was the Lessee of appellant and that Company owed a
duty to appellant to protect appellant's interest in the
mining claims against the Sheriff's Sale. He alleged
a breach of this duty by Union Carbide Nuclear Company in permitting the Sheriff's Sale to take place and
claimed damages aaginst Union Carbide Nuclear Company for the reasonable value of appellant's interest
in the properties. (R. #8005, p. 27) Respondents filed a
Reply to the counterclaim setting up the defense of res
adjudicata and the defense that the Sheriff's Sale cannot be collaterally attacked. (R. #8005, p. 31)
Appellant knew of the Sheriff's Sale before it took
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plaeP, inasn1uch as he attended the sale in person and

served upon respondents a l\lotion requesting the recall
of the \Yrit of Ext>cution and a temporary restraining
order against the Sheriff's selling the properties upon
the execution. Apparently appellant abandoned this
motion in that it does not appear as having been filed
with the Court, and no further action was taken b~·
appellant before the Sheriff's Sale was held.
No proceedings have been commenced in Civil No.
74G8 to set aside the Sheriff's Sale of the 1nining properties as hereinabove set out, nor has any claim adverse
to respondents been asserted to any interest in the
mining properties or the funds involved in this suit
by an~· one other than appellant.
Respondents thereupon filed a l\1otion for Sum1nary
Judgment based upon the files of the Court in the
pending action and the files of the Court in the prior
action. This motion was originally heard by the Court
on June 30, 1958 and was denied without prejudice to
respondents' rene-wal thereof. Respondents thereupon
renewed the motion for summary judgment which was
heard October :27, 1958 pursuant to notice thereof served
upon each of the parties. No one appeared for either
defendant or appellant at the hearing of that motion,
(R. #8005, p. 43) and the Court granted plaintiffs' Motiort
for Sun1n1ary Judgment.
In connection with the October 27, 1958 Motion for
Sum1nary Judgment, although Union Carbide Nuclear
Cmnpany did not appear to argue the 1notion, on October
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:2-1, 1958 the attorney for Vnion Carbide Nuclear Company sent a letter to Judge Keller respecting the motion
wherein he verified the amounts of royalty accrued by
Union Carbide Nuclear Company as alleged in the affidavit of Thomas C. Cuthbert attached to the ~lotion for
Summary Judgment.

rl,he Judgment was entered by the Court on October
31, 1958. As outlined in respondents' Memorandum of
Authorities filed with this Court in connection with
respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal, eleven
days after the entry of judgment, on November 11,
1958, appellant served by mail a pleading designated
Motion to Vacate Judgment. This 1notion was heard
June 29, 1959. At the hearing of this motion, the Court
on its own motion directed certain minor amendments
to be made in the judgment, and the Amended Judgment
was entered July 7, 1959, (R. #8005, p. 48) and a Notice
of Appeal was filed by appellant on August 4, 1959.
( R. #8005, p. 50).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDI·CTION TO REVIEW
ANY MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE JUDGMENT OF
OCTOBER 31, 1958 IN THAT NO APPEAL WAS TIMELY
TAKEN.
POINT II.
EXTENT OF REVIEW IS LIMITED TO CONSIDERING
ERROR IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT,
OR IN MAKING AMENDMENT.
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POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO VACATE NOR IN THE COURT'S AMENDMENT
OF THE JUDGMENT.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ENTERING
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
ARGU~1:ENT

POINT I.
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDI·CTION TO REVIEW
ANY MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE JUDGMENT OF
OCTOBER 31, 1958 IN THAT NO APPEAL WAS 'TIMELY
TAKEN.

':l_lhe J udgu1ent of October 31, 1958 was the final
judgment frmn '"hich a ti1nely appeal would have to be
taken. A sin1ilar situation arose in IJ. B. 'l Wissahickon .
(CA 2d, 1952) 200 F. 2d 93G. The district court had
granted a 1notion for summary judgment against defendants by a written opinion on April10, 1951. Approximately nine 1nonths later, on January 23, 1952, plaintiff
had prepared judg~nents for the court's signature and
noticed these up for settle1nent. Defendants presented
motions to file supplemental answers and to reargue
certain 1notions which had previously been denied. On
February 1, 1952 the matters were heard, and defendant's Inotions were denied and the court signed the
order and judgn1ent prepared by plaintiff. Defendant~
appea~ed frmn these judgments. and romplain of the
~~rlier adverse rulings.
1

•
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The court said, at page 938 :
"We may first address ourselves to the question whether or not the appeals taken on March
31, 1952, were timely. They were of course within
the proper time, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 73 (a),
as appeals from the orders of February 1, 1952,
but not from those of April 10, 1951. But the
earlier orders were clearly the final judgments.
No more explicit mandate for a plaintiff's judgment than that granting a summary judgment
in the amount claimed can be conceived; and notation of the grant in the civil docket on that
date became the judgment under the provisions of
F.R. 59. * * * * Nor would the date be changed
by forms of judgment later submitted by counsel,
even if these are signed by the judge."
Respondents' Memorandum of Authorities, in connection with their motion to dismiss the appeal heretofore filed and argued, contains most of the authorities
and argument in connection with the point that a motion
made under Rule 60 does not extend the time for appeal,
and these authorities will not be repeated in this brief,
since they are already before the Court. This Court
has taken respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal
under advisement pending consideration of the case on
its merits.
POINT II.
EXTENT OF REVIEW IS LIMI'TED TO CONSIDERING
ERROR IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT,
OR IN MAKING AMENDMENT.

On June 29, 1959, approximately nine 1nonths after
entry of judgment, appellant's Motion to vacate the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Judgment wa~ heard and denied err. ~, Case #8005, p.
:~). The ·Court then, on its own rnotion, arnended the
judgment according to the statements made by the court
in directing the arnendment. The Court apparently made
the arnendrnent to clarify the fact that the court was
not making a detern1ination as to the rights of any
persons who were not parties to the suit.
Unless appellant can show that the court cmnmitted
prejudicial error in denying his motion to vacate the
judgment, or, in n1aking the amendment which it did,
then this Court rnust affirn1 the lower court. Any question of errors committed by the court in entering its
October 31, 1958 judgrnent are not subject to review
on this appeal.
Several cases have so limited the extent of review
under the Federal Rules, which are practically identical
with Utah Rules.
In Saenz v. J(enedy, (CA 5th, 1950) 178 F. 2d 417,
the district court had granted defendant's motion for
summary judgrnent by docket entry on August 8, 1948.
Formal judgrnents were entered in the nine cases during
Septen1ber and October, the last being on October 13,
1948. X o notices of appeal ·were filed within thirty days.
:JI otions under Rule 60 (b) were filed in January 1949
to have judgments vacated on the ground they were void
and involved collusion between the trial court and plaintiffs. These rnotions were denied and notices of appeal
wen~ filed within 30 days fron1 the denial.
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The Appellate Court said, at page 419:
•'Since the notices of appeal were filed within
thirty days of the overruling of the motions to
vacate final judgments for collusion and fraud
on appeal thereunder would bring up to this
Court for review only the propriety or impropriety - the correctness or the error - of the
Court below in denying these motions to vacate.
It would not bring up for review by this Court
the final judgments entered in September, 1948..
From these final judgments no appeals were
taken within thirty days and this Court, is, therefore, without jurisdiction to review same. The
appeals in these causes frmn such final judgments
1nust be dismissed."
See also Tarkington v. U. S. Lines Company (C.
A. 2, 1955) 222 Fed. 2d 358: 7 Moore's Federal Practice,
pp. 341-2; pp. 331-2, Sections 60.30(3); 60.27.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO VACATE NOR IN THE COURT'S AMENDMENT
OF THE JUDGMENT.

In his brief, appellant 1nakes no contention of error
with respect to either of the points which is properly
reviewable by this court. However, respondents will
discuss them to show the correctness of the trial court's
denial of appellant's motion to vacate the judgment
and the immaterial effect of the amendment which it
made to the judgment.
Considering first the denial of appellant's motion
to vacate the judgment, that motion alleged that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

jndgment was void; that the pleadings presented mau~rial issues of fact, and that respondents' 1notion had
been supported by affidavits based upon information
and belief rather than on personal knowledge.
'The only possible basis for relief frorn the judgment
1s under Rule 60(b). Exa1nination of Rule 60(b) in

the light of appellant's rnotion discloses that of these
grounds only the contention that the judgment was void
comes within the purview of that rule. The other grounds
stated, if true, would only constitute error at law, and
this is not a ground for relief under Rule 60(b). As
to whether or not the judgment is void, the record disdoses that the court had personal jurisdiction over all
parties to the suit, and that they appeared and pleaded.
The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The court having jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter, the judgment was not void, no matter
how erroneous it might have been. 7 Moore's Federal
Practice, p. 259, Sec. 60.25(2). Therefore, the trial court
had no alternative but to deny the rnotion to vacate
the judgment, which it properly did.
Looking next at the amendment which the court
made after denying appellant's motion, it is seen that
this was rnade by the court on its own motion. Rule
60 provides two types of relief from judgments. Rule
60(a) deals with a court by motion or on its own
initiative correcting clerical mistakes and errors in
judgments arising from oversight or omission. Rule
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GO(b) relates to relief from judgn1ents for certain
fied grounds on motion of a party.

~PP~·i

The trial court probably felt it was correcting an
error arising frmn oversight or omission when it ordered
the amendment, and hence would have been proceeding
under Rule 60(a). On the other hand it may have concluded the amendment was responsive to appellant's
arguments on his 1notion, and therefore ordered the
amendment as correcting a mistake, within the purview
of Rule 60(b) (1), although this ground was not set out
in appellant's motion to vacate.
Although respondents believe the mnend1nent should
not have been made, they believe the mnendment comes
within the provisions of Rule 61, as being harmless
error which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. Since the purport of the amendment "'as to
clarify that the court was not deternuning the rights
of any persons not parties to the suit, the mnendment
did nothing to the judgment which would not have been
done as a matter of general law. The doctrine of res
adjudicata is clearly limited to parties to suits or their
privies, and for this reason, the judg1nent could not ]wye
any effect upon persons not parties to the suit.
That the effect of the muendn1ent does not prejudice
appellant in any way is de1nonstrated by the statement
contained in his brief at page 7, where he says. "The
mnended judgment acrmnplishes the smne result

[a~

the first jndgnwnt]."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
For the foregoing reasons, respondents believe that,
in:-;ofar as the only issues properly before this Court
are concerned, there has been no prejudicial error committed which would justify a reversal of the trial
;·onrt 's actions.
POINT IV.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ENTERING
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

Respondents believe that the foregoing portions of
this brief have completely disposed of the matters which
8hould properly be considered by this Court. However,
because appellant has devoted his entire brief to matters
which he contends were errors committed by the trial
court when it granted respondents' motion for summary
judgrnent on October 31, 1958, and in order to dispel
any doubts which the Court might have that by affirming
the trial court's rulings it might become an indirect
party to a grave injustice, consideration will be given
to those aspects of the case which were decided by the
Judgment of October 31, 1958.
Even assurning appellant had made a timely appeal
from the October 31, 1958 judgn1ent, this Court would not
be justified in reversing the trial court's action. As stated
above, appellant was served with notice of the hearing
of respondent's motion for summary judgment, and was
thereby given an opportunity to appear and present the
arguments which he now advances as error of the trial
court. He did not avail himself of this opportunity, and
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permitted the judgment to be entered without his appearance. For this reason he may not be heard to complain
of errors allegedly committed by the trial court in hi~
absence.
It is well settled that the scope of review on appeal
from a default judgment is very limited. 5 C.J.S. p. 711,
Appeal & Error, Sec. 1467. It is held that such revie\r
is limited to an exam~nation of the pleadings, and that
questions as to the sufficiency of evidence upon which
the judgment was based is not open to review, People
v. Taliaferro, 149 C.A. 2d 822, 309 P. 2d 48; and that an
appeal will not lie frmn a default judgn1ent '"hich is
1nerely voidable or erroneous, Pacific Savings an.a, Loa11
v. Bekins, 146 Ore. 385, 29 P. 2d 816.
It is sub1nitted that the trial court cmn1nitted no error
in entering the sumn1ary judgment of October 31, 1958.
This judg1nent is the only result which properly can lw
reached if one puts hi:mself in the role of the trial co1irt
and exmnines the pleadings and n1aterials it had beforr
it in ruling on respondents' n1otion for summary judgn1ent.

The trial court had before it the cmnplaint, answer
and third party complaint of Union Carbide Nuclear
Co., appellant's answer and counterclaini., the n1otion for
stunmary judg1nent and the files and records of· tlw
prior action. ·
Consideration of the correctness of the. trial court'~
.
ruling hreak~ dmn1 into the following; facets: (l) lssnr~
'•,.

'

.',•

•

\'.

•

1 •• '

•

•

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

between re:-;pondents and Union Carbide; (2) Issues
between respondents and appellant as to accrued royaltip:-;; (3) Issues between respondents and appellant
as to futnre royalties, and ( 4) Issues between appellant
and Union Carbide as raised by appellant's Counterclaim.
These matters will be discussed in that order.
As between respondents and Union Carbide,
the only genuine issue raised by the pleadings was a question of what 1nining claims respondents had acquired
an interest in frmn the prior suit. Union Carbide claimed
it owned the Temple mining claims, except for the portions passing to respondent's and their co-owners by a
lease of May 1950. In the motion for summary judgment,
respondents acknowledged this and claimed only an interest in the royalties accruing under that lease. This eliminated the only material issue between respondents and
Fnion Carbide. Its counsel thereupon advised the court
he would not appear to resist the motion and verified
the amounts of royalties accrued under the lease up to
the time of the motion. These amounts were exactly
the smne as set forth in the affidavit attached to respondent's motion and the amounts on which judgment was
entered. These became the first two items of the October 31, 1958 judgment.
(1)

It is noteworthy that Union Carbide, the judgment
debtor has not appealed, indicating the correctness of
the lack of issues between respondents and that company.

(2) As to issues between appellant and respondents, these are best broken down into two categories,
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namely, as to royalties already accrued and as to the
future rights to royalties. By appellant's ans·wer it i~
seen that he \vas clai1ning the entire interest in the royalty income for hiinself. This had been the question resolved by the prior action in which the court established
a 12/21sts interest in this royalty income in respondent~,
and appellant \Vas left with 9/21sts interest. That judgInent in Civil No. 7468 was res adjudicata of the rights
of the parties until their rights changed by virtue of the
Sheriff's execution sale. Royalties accrued up to that
time were divided in the judgn1ent ·with respondents obtaining judgn1ent for only 12/21sts thereof. Appellant
cannot contend for anything contrary to this.
(3) By their con1plaint respondents asked for a
determination of their rights to future royalties under
the lease. At the time the complaint was filed, any determination would have required a ruling that respondents
were entitled to a 12/21sts interest in the Tomlinson
portion of those royalties. This would have been in
keeping with the judgment of the prior action. Hmvever,
by his answer to the third party cmnplaint and counterclaim, appellant brought before the Court the fact that
a Sheriff's sale had been had pursuant to a writ of exeeution at which respondent's had purchased all of the
re1naining interest appellant had in the property. A copy
of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was attached to Appellant's pleading. :B.,rmn this the 1natter of respondents'
interest acquired by the :May 1, 1958 execution sale came
into the suit.
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In connection with appellant's answer, he had alleged
the ~heriff's sale was void. To support this he alleges
only that respondents were the brother and sisters of
appellant and that because of this relationship the sheriff's sale on writ of execution is void. (R. 8005, page 26.)
B)· his pleadings he 1nakes no contention that the price
paid was inadequate or that there was any unfairness
in the conduct of the sale. These latter contentions first
appear in appellant's brief.
The nwtion for summary judgment therefore necessitated an examination of whether or not there was any
genuine issue of any material fact concerning the Sheriff's sale and if not what interest respondents acquired
thereby as a matter of law.
As to the facts concerning the Sheriff's sale there
was no dispute: Respondents had purchased all the remaining interest of appellant at a sheriff's sale on a writ
of execution and had paid $3,000.00 for that interest. All
of the records relating to that sale are a part of the record
of Civil No. 7468, which was before the court on the motion.
In this state of the pleadings, as a matter of law
the ·Court had to reject the contention that a person may
not levy execution upon the property of his brother
against whom he has a judgment. Facing an allegation
that the sale was void, it would then be incumbent upon
the Court to examine the proceedings of the sale to see
if there was anything about the sale which made it void
on its face. There being nothing of this nature, the Court
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could not do otherwise than rely upon the validity of thr
sheriff's sale, which it did.
The next question to be resolved by the trial court
after determining the validity of the sheriff's sale was th(J
extent of the interest respondents had in future royaltie;.;.
By the prior action, respondent's had obtained tlw
12/21sts interest in the 3.7158% royalty interest. By th•!
sheriff's sale, respondents acquired all the remaining
interest that appellant had.
The files and records of Civil No. 7-!68 show that
at the time of c01nmencement of the prior action, appellant had the legal title to the entire interest to the property, subject only to the possible equitable interests of
respondents and Mrs. Lillie M. Tomlinson, the mother
of the parties. These possible equities ·w·ould arise only
by reason of the understanding and agreements of the
parties at the tilne the legal title was conveyed by rrspondents and their mother to appellant. The determination of those equities was the precise question involved
in the prior suit.
In the trial of that suit, l\Irs. Lillie l\1. Ton1linson
testified as a witness and disclaimed any interest in thr
property she had conveyed to appellant. (Tr. 1, No. 7468,
pp. 186, 197, 199, 203, 204). It therefore bec01nes apparent that at the conclusion of the prior suit, appellant wa-.:
,left with 9/:2lsts interest, and by reason of l\Irs. Lillir
T01nlinson's disclailner by her testiinony there is no
.q-uestion that he held the entire· beneficial interest in
that 9/21~~t intere~t. 'l1 he f:heriff's deed therefor~ rC'~nlterl
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in a eonveyance of a 9/:21st interest to respondents, and
respondents thereupon became the owners of the entire
:1.7158% interest in the 1nining properties and were such
at the time of the 1notion for summary judgn1ent.
Although it goes without saying that the only persons
bound by the judg1nent are those who are parties to the
:5uit or their privies, the trial court felt constrained to
amend the judgment in this respect in order that no question of res adjudicata Inight be raised if Lillie M. Tomlinson should in the future attempt to assert an equitable
interest in the property in a later action she might bring
against respondents. As to this point, however, see
Fa1tlkner v. DooZy, 28 U. 236, 78 P. 365; Wood v. Fox,
Whitney v. Fox, 8 U. 380, 32 P. 48, aff'd. 66 U.S. 648, 41
L. Ed. 1149, for cases holding that even apart from her
disclaimer she would be barred from asserting any interest at this tin1e because of laches and the statute of limitations. Regardless of the outcome of any such possible
later action by the mother, legal title to the entire interest
is in respondents by virtue of the judgment in the prior
action and the Sheriff's sale.
(4) There remains only to consider appellant's
counterclaim against Union Carbide. The allegations of
the counterclaim are that Union Carbide was the lessee
of the mining properties involved in the suit and that by
reason thereof it owed a duty to protect appellant's interest from the Sheriff's sale under writ of execution. (R.
8005, p. 27) There is no allegation of any duty except
as arises from Union Carbide's leasing the premises.
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These leases between appellant and Union Carbide are
part of the record (R. 2, No. 7468, pp. 10-3G), and they
show there was no duty imposed on the lessee such a~
contended. Appellant was aware of the forthcoming
sheriff's sale, having served a motion to recall the "-rit
of execution and for a temporary restraining order
against the sheriff's conducting the sale. Having knmYn
of the sale and having attended it in person, he was fully
capable of protecting any rights he had in the property.
Conceding all of the facts alleged in appellant's
counterclaim as true, the proposition then becomes one of
law of whether or not a lessee, merely by reason of his
status as such, o·wes a duty to his lessor to prevent r:t
sheriff's sale of the property pursuant to a writ of execution where the lessor knows of the sale himself. There
can be no such recovery on facts such as those alleged as
a matter of law.
From the foregoing, it is seen that there was no genuine issue of any 1naterial fact for the court to resolve by
trial, and that the court as a n1atter of law was correct
in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Two other n1atters raised by appellant in his brief
should be briefl~~ n1entioned. First, appellant contends
the affidavit of Thmnas (\ Cuthbert was based on information and belief and the granting of a judgn1ent based
upon this constitutes reversible error. Apart frmn rnion
Carbide'~ rounsel's Yerif:dng these figures to the rourt.
exmnination of the affidavit shows a staten1ent of an
admission against interest n1ade by rounsel for rnion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
Carbide. This statmnent is not based upon infonnation
and hPliPI', and is competent evidence of the facts stated
then·in. The affiant states that based upon the admission
against intPrest as to the fact, he believes the truth of
the mnounts of accrued royalty set out in the affidavit.
It is further submitted that appellant is not prejudiced
in any way hy the affidavit, since it goes to the amount
to be paid out by Union Carbide, which has not appealed
from the judgment against it.
X ext, appellant argues that respondents did not give
him an opportunity to object to the form of the amended
judgment before it was entered. Examination of the
transcript of proceedings reveals that the Court directed
respondents' counsel to prepare an amended judgment
and file it. If appellant desired to object, he would have
an opportunity to do so by a motion to strike. A copy
of the amended judgment was mailed to appellant on
July 7, 1959, the date it was entered, and he made no
motion respecting that judgment as the Court had proposed. For this reason he cannot contend he was prejudiced in any way by this procedure.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Court

must dismiss the appeal now before it on the following
grounds: It has no jurisdiction to decide any of the
issues raised by appellant's brief. The judgment of
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scribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial
court committed no error in the entry of that judgment
and the same was proper. If there was any error comInitted by the Court, it was in amending the judgment on
July 7, 1959, when it had no jurisdiction to make an
amendment for other than an error of omission. Such
amendment, since it merely eliminates any effect the
prior judgrnent might have had on persons not partie~
to the suit, is not prejudicial to the rights of any of the
parties and is therefore harmless error. The errors complained of by appellant, if they were in fact errors, constituted harn1less errors which must be disregarded. It
is noteworthy that this litigation and its antecedent have
been in the courts for over five years, and have involved
expenditures of tirne and n1oney disproportionate to
the amounts in controversy. Respondents respectfully
urge that this Court should endeavor to bring: thi~ litigation to a close without further controversy.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTOX &.
LO\VE and
THO~IAS C. CFTHBERT.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respon.denfs
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